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New Process steel:  
steveNs’ last staNd agaiNst 
chevroN aNd labor
Scott B. Mac Lagan*
through its 2010 New Process Steel decision, the supreme court 
effectively threw out nearly 600 decisions and orders made by the National 
labor relations board (“Nrlb” or “the board”) over a twenty-seven month 
period.1 the majority opinion was authored by Justice stevens, whose 
fifty year tenure on the Court has been mostly characterized by the liberal 
nature of his decisions.2  while this championship of liberal ideals surprised 
those conservatives who first supported his confirmation to the Court,3 
Justice steven’s opinion in New Process Steel is evidence that he maintains 
some of the conservative values evidenced at the time of his confirmation. 
 on its face, stevens’ New Process Steel opinion reflects a sound and rational 
legal analysis of legislative history and intent.4 however, a more in depth 
 
*   J.d. 2011, touro college Jacob d. Fuchsberg law center.  i would like to thank 
Professor Patricia rooney for her invaluable assistance throughout the writing process.  i 
would also like to thank my wife risa, and my sons, Jonas and ryley, for their immeasurable 
patience and support.
1. See New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2645 (2010)
2. See generally, Jeffrey tooBin, the nine: inSide the Secret WorLd of the 
SupreMe court 56-57, 66-68, 167 (Doubleday 2007) (characterizing Justice Stevens as 
liberal); see also charles F. Jacobs & christopher e. smith, The Influence of John Paul 
Stevens: Opinion Assignments By The Senior Associate Justice, 51 Santa cLara L. rev. 
743, 748 (2011) (noting that, over time, stevens more frequently sided with the liberal 
members of the supreme court).
3. See id. at 747 (“Justice stevens proved to be a more liberal decision maker than 
many of his republican political supporters had expected.”); see also richard g. wilkins, 
Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1996 Term, 25 haStingS conSt. L.Q. 35, 100 (1997) 
(offering statistical data on supreme court Justice voting patterns over several years 
beginning in 1988, which shows a “clear and growing domination of the [court’s] liberal 
frontier by Justice stevens”).
4. 130 S. Ct. at 2641 (“To conclude that Congress intended to authorize such a 
procedure to contravene the three-member board question, we would need some evidence 
of that intent”).
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analysis of the opinion produces questions as to whether this decision was 
motivated by a desire to adhere to the legislative intent of the law or whether the 
reasoning of the opinion was crafted to fit within the majority’s desired result.5 
claiming the latter was the court’s true intent, i will present evidence that 
the Court’s interpretation of the law flies in the face of its own jurisprudence 
and that the court used only those parts of the law that it believed would 
reach its desired outcome—ignoring other relevant facts or law.6 this article 
will analyze the reasoning of the New Process Steel decision and its impact 
on american society,7 specifically the American labor movement,8 in order to 
determine if this was a proper exercise of judicial authority or whether this was 
the tail wagging the dog.
Part i of this article introduces the relevant issues and law that led to the New 
Process Steel decision, including a discussion of the crisis at the board when 
it’s membership fell below the statutorily required quorum.9  Part ii examines 
Justice stevens’ analysis of the legislative history of the taft-hartley act10 and 
presents an alternative to this analysis.11 Part iii presents determinations of the 
legitimacy of two-member, Nlrb decisions based on statutory construction 
prior to the taft-hartley act.12 Part iv discusses the effects of New Process 
Steel through a detailed, statistical analysis of the cases affected by the supreme 
court’s decision.13 through careful analysis of the New Process Steel, Part 
V suggests possible causes of the Court’s decision, specifically focusing on 
the absence of any discussion or application of Chevron deference and the 
majority’s approach to statutory interpretation.14 
5. See infra part v.
6. See connor N. raso & william N. eskridge, Chevron as a Canon, Not a 
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 
110 coLuM. L. rev. 1727, 1727 (Nov. 2010) (analyzing statistical data on Justice voting 
patterns to argue that Justices are guided more by policy considerations than by past levels 
of deference to agencies).  
7. See, e.g., Julia di vito, comment, The New Meaning of New Process v. Steel, L.P. 
v, NLRB, 46 Wake foreSt L. rev. 307, 327-29 (2011) (finding that the decision in New 
Process Steel “does solidify a trend” of “formalistic statutory interpretation”); daniel J. 
moore & James a. burns, Jr., U.S. Supreme Court Voids Almost 600 Decisions Issued By 
Two-Member NLRB, eMpLoyMent LaW Watch (Jun. 29, 2010), available at http://www.
employmentlawwatch.com/tags/national-labor-relations-board/ (“it is not clear . . . how 
[the court] will treat a losing party in such a case that now seeks ‘another bite at the apple’ 
in the hopes of reversing an unfavorable outcome”) (alteration in original).
8. See Supreme Court Sides with Employers in NLRB Case, afL-cio noW BLog 
(2010), http://blog292.aflcio.org/2010/06/17/supreme-court-sides-with-employers-in-
nlrb-case/ (expressing that the general counsel for the aFl-cio was disappointed that the 
Court rewarded employer stall tactics and effectively penalized workers whose cases had 
been resolved.); see also moore & burns, supra note 7 (finding that it is possible that the 
majority could use this as an opportunity to issue new opinions in some of those cases that 
favor labor over management).
9. See infra Part i.
10. 29 u.s.c. § 153 (1975).
11. See infra Part ii.
12. See infra Part iii.
13. See infra Part iv.
14. See infra Part v.
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introduction
in 2010, the supreme court decided New Process Steel, determining that the 
Nlrb lacked authority under the National labor relations act15 (“the act”) 
to issue decisions when the board consisted of only two members.16  the court 
reasoned that a two-member board failed to meet the statutory requirements 
for a quorum, and, thus, the two-member group lacked the authority to issue 
any decisions.17 while New Process Steel only directly affected six cases, the 
impact of the court’s decision effectively rendered 595 decisions and orders 
issued by the two-member group illegitimate.18  
the majority of the court based its decision on an interpretation of the 
statutory language of the act and on the legislative history of the statute in its 
current form.19 interestingly, any reference to Chevron deference was absent 
from the court’s opinion.20 Furthermore, although the dissent pointed out that 
four of the five circuits that had addressed this issue found in favor of the 
board’s authority, the majority ignored this point.21 
as the dissent pointed out, and the majority conceded, the  board had 
previously made decisions when it consisted only of two members.22 however, 
the majority distinguished these prior instances of two-member boards by 
noting that the issue before the court involved a protracted period of time: 
twenty-seven months.23 the dissent countered by arguing that the taft-
Hartley Act of 1947 increased the membership of the Board from three to five 
members as a means “to increase the Board’s efficiency by permitting multiple 
 
 
15. National labor relations act §1, 29 u.s.c § 151 (1947).
16. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2635-36 (2010) (holding that 
a two-member group cannot exercise the delegation authority provided under 29 u.s.c. § 
153(b)).
17. 130 s. ct. at 2640. (determining that the board may delegate its powers “only to a 
‘group of three or more members’” otherwise two members could permanently circumvent 
the statutory quorum requirement) (citing 29 u.s.c. § 153(b) (1982)). 
18. See infra Part iv.
19. 130 s. ct. at 2640-41.  
20. Compare chevron u.s.a., inc. v. Natural res. def. council, 467 u.s. 837, 
843 (1984) (holding that where the statutory language is “ambiguous with respect to the 
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute”) with 130 s. ct. at 2640-41 (conceding that “there 
are two different ways to interpret” the statute and that “the government’s reading of the 
delegation clause is textually permissible in a narrow sense” but rejecting the agency’s 
interpretation as ”structurally implausible”). 
21. See 130 s. ct. at 2648 (noting that even the court that reached the same result as 
the majority rejected a three member requirement).
22. See New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2650 (2010) (“those two-
member boards issued [three] published decisions in 1936 (reported at 2 N.l.r.b. 198-
240); 237 published decisions in 1940 (reported at 27 N.l.r.b. 1-1395 and 28 N.l.r.b. 
1-115); and 225 published decisions in 1941 (reported at 35 N.l.r.b. 24-1360 and 36 
N.l.r.b. 1-45)”); see also 130 s. ct. at 2642 n.3.
23. 130 s. ct. at 2642 n.3 (“[t]he two-member board at issue in this case, extending 
over two years, is unprecedented in the history of the post-taft-hartley board”).
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three-member groups to exercise the full powers of the board.”24 however, the 
majority dismissed the argument that the legislative history of the act indicated 
a “congressional objective of Board efficiency,” and simply concluded that “if 
congress had wanted to allow the board to continue to operate with only two 
members, it could have kept the board quorum requirement at two.”25 while 
the dissent argued that the legislative history of the act indicated that granting 
authority to a two member quorum of the three member board was in line with 
the legislative purpose of the 1947 amendments, they failed to fully expand 
their analysis of this history.26
Background of NEW PROCESS STEEL
on august 25, 2006, the district lodge 34, international association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO, was certified as the exclusive 
bargaining unit for the employees at New Process steel, lP plant in butler, 
indiana.27 after nearly a year of negotiating, the representatives for both the 
employees and the employer reached a tentative agreement.28 the employer’s 
negotiators, however, refused to sign this agreement until it was approved by 
the employees.29 The Union held a ratification meeting, and pursuant to its 
internal ratification procedures, the contract was authorized and subsequently 
executed by the employer.30 later, the employer repudiated the contract after 
learning of the ratification procedures utilized by the Union.31 subsequently, 
the employer withdrew recognition from the union as the exclusive bargaining 
unit for its employees.32 
The Union filed a complaint with the Board, which found that the 
respondent and the union reached a binding collective-bargaining agreement, 
effective august 12, 2007, and that the respondent unlawfully repudiated that 
agreement on september 11, 2007.33 the board further found, as a matter of 
 
24. 29 u.s.c. § 153 (1975) (amending the wagner act to increase the National labor 
Relations Board membership from three to five); accord 130 s. ct. at 2651 (referring to 
senate reports that the ability to operate the board in panels of three would allow the board 
to “dispose of cases expeditiously”) (citing s.rep. No. 105-80, at 8 (1947)).
25. 130 S. Ct. at 2644. (characterizing to a two-person board as “hard to imagine” 
given the congressional limit of a three-person delegation).
26. See id. at 2651 (arguing that congress intended to preserve the extraordinary 
practice of two-member panels during the 1947 amendments).
27. New Process steel, lP, 353 N.l.r.b. 13 at 3 (2008).
28. See id. at 2 (noting that the parties had reached an initial collective bargaining 
agreement). 
29. See id. at 4.
30. See id. at 5 (indicating that the parties met on aug. 12, 2007).
31. New Process steel, lP, 353 N.l.r.b. 13 at 5-6 (claiming that the union 
representatives had falsely told the employer that a valid agreement existed, when a 
majority of individuals had not voted for the contract, and there were insufficient votes to 
initiate a strike). 
32. See New Process steel, lP, 353 N.l.r.b. 25 at 1 (2008). 
33. See 353 N.l.r.b. 13 at 8 (2008) (holding that since the employer did not bargain 
with the union over the ratification procedure to be used, the employer could not reject the 
collective bargaining agreement based on the Union’s choice of ratification procedure.). 
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law, that the respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the union 
on september 12, 2007, in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the act.34 
in seeking appellate review, New Process steel did not merely challenge the 
orders of the board, but it also “challenged the authority of the two-member 
board to issue the orders.”35 New Process steel argued that since the board 
had only two members when it issued its decisions, the board failed to meet 
the statutorily required quorum of three.36 
the seventh circuit found in favor of the board, concluding “that the then-
sitting two members constituted a valid quorum of a three-member group to 
which the board had legitimately delegated its powers.”37 the seventh circuit’s 
decision was in agreement with four prior challenges to the two-member board’s 
authority.38 however, on the same day as the New Process Steel decision, the d.c. 
circuit court issued a contrasting opinion wherein the court found that the two-
member board did not have decision-making authority.39 Furthermore, the d.c. 
circuit court concluded that the Nlra’s quorum requirement was necessarily 
tied to the membership requirement and, therefore, the power of the board to 
delegated its authority was suspended.40 
based on this four to one circuit court “split” as to “whether, following a 
delegation of the board’s powers to a three-member group, two members may 
continue to exercise that delegated authority once the group’s (and the board’s) 
membership falls to two,”41 the supreme court “granted certiorari to resolve 
34. 353 N.l.r.b. 25 at 1; National labor relations act §1, 29 u.s.c § 151 (1947) 
(establishing the policy of the united states to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce, including employer refusal to accept the 
procedure of collective bargaining); National labor relations act § 8(a), 29 u.s.c. 
§ 158 (2006) (establishing that an employer’s refusal to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of the employees shall be an unfair labor practice).      
35. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2639 (2010) ; accord Kelli ann 
Kleisinger & richard a. bales, The Validity of the Two-Member NLRB, 6 Seton haLL 
cir. rev. 261, 268 (2010) (“recent petitioners have attempted to overturn the Nlrb’s 
rulings based, not on the merits of their cases, but rather on the invalidity of the two-
member panel”).
36. 29 u.s.c. § 153(b) (1988).  
37. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 564 F.3d 840, 845-47 (7th cir. 2009) (placing 
the burden on New Process to find statements in the legislative history that forbade the 
board from operating with a quorum of two, or showed that congress was specifically 
concerned with the delegation of power to board members whose terms were about to end). 
38. Compare Ne. land servs., ltd. v. Nlrb, 560 F.3d 36, 41 (1st cir. 2009) (holding 
that 29 u.s.c. § 153(b) grants the Nlrb authority to “act with only two members, both 
of whom were part of a three-member group to which the board validly delegated all of its 
authority”); and snell island sNF llc v. Nlrb, 568 F.3d 410, 424 (2d cir. 2009); with 
Narricot indus., l.P. v. Nlrb, 587 F.3d 654, 660 (4th cir. 2009); and teamsters local 
union No. 523 v. Nlrb, 590 F.3d 849, 852 (10th cir. 2009).
39. See laurel baye healthcare of lake lanier, inc. v. Nlrb, 564 F.3d 469 (d.c. 
Cir. 2009) (holding that the three member quorum requirement must be satisfied “at all 
times” and the board cannot circumvent this requirement by delegating its authority).
40. See id. at 473–75 (finding a director’s powers are suspended whenever the 
membership of the board falls below the quorum requirement, which in this case, the court 
found to be three).
41. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2638 (2010).
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the conflict.”42 although the court ultimately agreed with the conclusion of 
the D.C. Circuit Court, finding that the two-member Board lacked authority 
to issue any decisions or orders, the court declined to adopt the circuit court’s 
reasoning.43 instead, the court based its decision on what it considered to be 
“the only way to harmonize and give meaningful effect to all of the provisions” 
of the act.44  
Briefly stated, Stevens’ analysis of the Act sounds more like Scalia’s 
textualist approach to interpreting statutes than stevens’ usual intentionalist 
approach.45  such a radical departure from a long established adherence to the 
intentionalist approach may be difficult to explain unless such departure was 
necessary to achieve a desired outcome.  that is, an intentionalist analysis 
would have produced a finding that the Court did not want and therefore 
stevens, in the twilight of his long and consistent pro-intentionalism career 
on the Court, had no choice but to join the textualists to find in favor of New 
Process steel.
LegiSLative hiStory/intent of taft-hartLey act
while both the majority and dissent in New Process Steel acknowledged 
that the taft-hartley act of 1947 was intended, at least in part, to increase 
the efficiency of the Board, neither opinion discussed the notion that a five 
member Board would increase the efficiency of the Board if it could delegate its 
authority to a group of three members—when only had two members present.46 
additionally, the majority’s argument that the act added two members to 




42. Id. at 2639. (granting certiorari to resolve the split between the d.c. circuit court 
and four other circuit courts).
43. Compare 130 s. ct. at 2636 (performing an extensive review of legislative 
history to determine congressional intent) with New Process steel v. Nlrb, 564 F.3d 840, 
846 (7th cir. 2009) (holding that the plain meaning of the act allowed the delegation to the 
two person panel to be effective and no review of legislative history was necessary). 
44. 130 s.ct. at 2640.
45. ronald turner, On the Authority of the Two-Member NLRB: Statutory 
Interpretation Approaches and Judicial Choices, 27 hofStra LaB. & eMp. L.J. 13, 19 
(2009) (citations omitted). intentionalism is the method of statutory interpretation that 
“seeks to discern the meaning and understanding of a statutory provision as held by 
the legislature and the legislators who enacted the law” through an analysis of the 
“statutory text and/or in legislative history (conference and committee reports, floor 
debates, statements by a bill’s sponsors and cosponsors, etc.).” championed by Justice 
antonin scalia, textualism is the method of statutory interpretation, “ that argues that 
‘[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed.’” Id. at 22 (citing antonin 
scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in a Matter of interpretation: 
federaL courtS and the LaW 1, 22 (amy guttman ed., 1997) (stating that textualism 
supports the interpretation that “the authoritive statement is the statutory text, not the 
legislative history or any other extrinsic material.”).
46. See New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2644-45 (2010) (stating the 
objective of the statute was for efficient operations when the board is at full power).
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was originally introduced to congress.47 in fact, “[in] the conference report, 
senator taft was advocating a seven-member board which would in turn work 
in two panels of three members each.”48 the house bill, on the other hand, 
sought to abolish the old Board, and, therefore, “the increase from three to five 
board members appears to be an obvious compromise between the house and 
senate versions” of the act.49 opponents to the bill, including senator James 
e. murray of montana, argued that “[e]nlarging the board [to seven members] 
is subject to the danger that it may make the board unwieldy and interfere with 
efficient administration,” and thus, Senator Murray concluded that the Board 
should only consist of a maximum of five members.50
when learning of the alterations to the senate bill by the conference report, 
senator morse expressed his regret that the bill would only increase the board 
members to a total of five. He stated that: 
“even seven members might be considered insufficient; but at least a 
seven-man board would permit the board to function as is provided for 
[his] section of the bill on a departmentalized basis of three members  
per department, leaving one member of the board free to carry on 
much of the administrative work of the board.”51 
however, the majority of congress found senator morse’s concerns to be 
groundless.52 a reasonable conclusion is that the majority of congress believed 
that the five member Board could nominally create two panels of three, with 
one member, probably the chair as a member of both groups. in actuality, each 
panel would only need to have the quorum of two members present to decide 
cases. the suggestion that the legislative intent of the act was to increase 
efficiency is also supported by a Washington Post article that was published 
 
47. See turner, supra note 45, at n. 106 (quoting 93 cong. rec. 3837 (apr. 23 1947) 
(remarks of sen. taft); see also 93 cong. rec. 1911 (mar. 10, 1947) (remarks of sen. 
morse) (arguing that the intention of the taft hartley drafters was to allow the Nlrb to sit 
in multiple panels of 3 not in a single large panel). 
48. John e. higgins, Jr., Labor Czars-Commissars-Keeping Women in the Kitchen-
The Purpose and Effects of the Administrative Changes Made By Taft-Hartley, 47 cath. 
u. L. rev. 941, 946 (1998); see also 93 cong. rec. 5117, 5148 (may 12, 1947), reprinted 
in 2 Nlrb, legislative history of the labor-management relations act, 1947 at 1500 
(1948) [hereinafter “Nlrb, legislative history of 1947”] (remarks of sen. aiken) (“the 
senate measure would increase the Nlrb to seven members.”) ; 93 cong. rec. 5117, 
5146 (may 12, 1947), reprinted in 2 Nlrb, legislative history of 1947 at 1495 (remarks 
of sen. ball) (“[t]he new seven-member National labor relations board which is to be 
set up.”) ; 93 cong. rec.5117, 5130 (may 12, 1947), reprinted in 2 Nlrb legislative 
history of 1947 at 1467 (remarks of sen. o’mahoney) (“so we now have reported by the 
committee a measure which proposes to increase the membership of the National labor 
relations board from three to seven . . .”).
49. higgins, supra note 48, at 946 (noting that “there was surprisingly little discussion 
of the size of the Board in the debates”).
50. 93 cong. rec. 4139, 4158 (april 25, 1947), reprinted in 1 Nlrb, legislative 
history of 1947 at 1052 (1948) (remarks of sen. murray).
51. 93 cong. rec. 6395, 6442 (June 5, 1947), reprinted in 2 Nlrb, legislative 
history of 1947 at 1562 (1948) (remarks of sen. morse).
52. gerard d. reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 geo. WaSh. 
L. rev. 285, 300 (1960) (noting that congress quickly overrode the veto of President 
truman to ensure that the bill was passed in the form reported by the conference).
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concurrently with the congressional debates over the passage of the act.53
therefore, even a cursory review of the legislative history of the act reveals 
that the intent behind increasing the size of the Board was to increase efficiency 
through the use of multiple panels composed of members of the board.54 these 
smaller groups would mirror the old board under the wagner act in that they 
would have three members with a quorum of two.55 a reasonable interpretation 
of the act, one which Justice stevens rejected in the majority opinion in New 
Process Steel, is that congress granted the board the authority to delegate 
“all powers of the board” in a three member group with a quorum of two.56 
This would reflect an intent to allow such a group to act just as the old Board 
did.57 Such an interpretation “harmonizes” and “gives meaningful effect” to 
the history and intent of the legislation in question.58  
vaLidity of tWo MeMBer pre-taft-hartLey deciSionS
From the enactment of the wagner act in 1935 until the passage of the 
taft-hartley act in 1947, the statutory requirements called for a three member 
board, with two members constituting a quorum.59 over the course of twelve 
years, there were three periods when the board had only two members.60 
during these periods, the two-member boards issued nearly 500 decisions.61 
the precedential value of these decisions is evidenced by the quantity of times 
these cases have been cited by state high courts,62 federal district 
53. Senate Labor Bill, WaShington poSt, (april 26, 1947) reprinted in  93 cong. 
rec. 5096, 5108 (may 9, 1947), reprinted in 2 Nlrb legislative history of 1947, at 1457 
(1948) (“the taft bill would give the Nlrb seven members instead of three, making 
possible two panels consisting of three or more members to speed up the disposition of 
cases.”).
54. higgins, supra note 48, at 946-47 (providing a thorough outline of the intention 
of the drafters and supporters of the act to increase the effectiveness of the board by 
utilizing several small panels).
55. See 29 u.s.c. § 153(b) (2006) (stating that the board under the wagner act 
provided for five members with the ability to delegate all powers to three members).
56. Id.
57. Contra New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2644 (2010) (holding 
that if congress wanted the board to act as it previously did it would not have changed the 
quorum requirement from two to three).
58. Contra id. at 2640, (stating that reading the word “continuously” into the 
delegation clause “is the only way to harmonize and give meaningful effect to all of the 
provisions in § 3(b)”).
59. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 451 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 u.s.c. § 153 (2006)).
60. 130 s. ct. at 2650; see Members of the NLRB Since 1935, nationaL LaBor 
reLationS Board, available at https://www.nlrb.gov/members-nlrb-1935 (denoting that 
the Nlrb had two members on three separate occasions: 9/01/36 – 9/22/36; 8/27/40 – 
11/25/40; 8/28/40 – 10/10/41).
61. 130 s. ct. 2635, 2650 (2010).
62. See, e.g., vlasic Farms, inc. v. Pennsylvania labor relations bd., 565 Pa. 555 
(Pa. 2001); hotel & rest. emp. & bartenders union, local No. 339 v. boca raton club, 
73 so. 2d 867 (Fla. 1954).
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courts,63 federal circuit courts,64 and the u.s. supreme court.65  
Significantly, Justice Stevens consistently maintained the validity of 
two-member board decisions under statutory language prior to taft-
hartley. indeed, he was not only a member of the majority opinion in 
NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp.,66 but he also 
authored the dissent in Action Automotive Inc.,67 in which he cited to the 
two-member board decision, Botany Worsted Mills, as authority.68 Justice 
Stevens explained this confirmation of the pre-Taft-Hartley, two-member 
board decisions and his corresponding denial of later, two-member board 
decisions, as a result of congress’ “change” in the statute from “provid[ing 
for a board quorum of two” to a board quorum of three.69 a comparison of 
the two statutes reveals that congress did not merely change the board’s 
quorum  requirement, but, rather, it also provided the board with the authority 
to delegate all of its powers to panels whose composition and quorum mirrored 
that of the old board.70
63. See, e.g., air canada v. Nmb, No. 79 civ. 4401 (ces), 1980 wl 73570 (s.d.N.y. 
Nov. 14, 1980); New Bedford Loomfixers’ Union v. Alpert, 110 F. Supp. 723 (Mass. Dist. 
ct. 1953).
64. See, e.g., hunter douglas, inc. v. Nlrb, 804 F.2d 808 (3d cir. 1986); 
montgomery ward & co., inc. v. Nlrb, 668 F.2d 291 (7th cir. 1981); westward-ho 
hotel co. v. Nlrb, 437 F.2d 1110 (9th cir. 1971); Nlrb v. gen. tube co., 331 F.2d 751 
(6th cir. 1964); douds v. int’l longshoremen’s ass’n, 241 F.2d 278 (2d cir. 1957); Nlrb 
v. darlington veneer co., 236 F.2d 85 (4th cir. 1956); Nlrb v. bemis bro. bag co., 206 
F.2d 33 (5th cir. 1953); whiting corp. v. Nlrb, 200 F.2d 43 (7th cir. 1952); Nlrb v. 
clara-val Packing co., 191 F.2d 556 (9th cir. 1951); Jones & laughlin steel corp. v. 
Nlrb, 146 F.2d 833 (5th cir. 1945); Nlrb v. Poultrymen’s serv. corp., 138 F.2d 204 (3d 
cir. 1943); lebanon steel Foundry v. Nlrb, 130 F.2d 404 (d.c. cir. 1942). 
65. See, e.g., Nlrb v. action auto., inc., 469 u.s. 490, 499 (1985); Nlrb v. 
hendricks cnty. rural elec. membership corp., 454 u.s. 170 (1981); u.s. v. ryan, 350 
u.s. 299 (1956); bethlehem steel co. v. N.y. state labor relations bd., 330 u.s. 767 
(1947); Nlrb v. e.c. atkins & co., 331 u.s. 398 (1947); Polish Nat’l alliance of u.s. v. 
Nlrb, 322 u.s. 643 (1944); Phelps dodge corp. v. Nlrb, 313 u.s. 177 (1941).
66. 454 u.s. 170 (reviewing a decision made by a two member board).
67. 469 u.s. at 500 (citing a decision made by the two-member board).
68. 27 N.l.r.b. 129 (1940) (holding that botany mill’s employees have the right to 
collectively bargain) (“wherever possible, it is obviously desirable that, in determination 
of the appropriate unit, we render collective bargaining of the company’s employees an 
immediate possibility”).  
69. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2644 (2010) (“[i]t is 
unsurprising that two members regularly issued board decisions prior to taft-hartley, 
because the statute then provided for a board quorum of two”) (citing 29 u.s. c. § 
153(b)).
70. Compare Nat’l labor relations (wagner) act, ch. 372, 49 stat. 449 (1935) 
(“[v]acancy in the board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise 
all the powers of the board, and two members, shall at all times, constitute a quorum.”), 
with labor-management relations (taft-hartley) act, 29 u.s.c. § 153(b) (2006)  
(“[B]oard is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all 
of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . [v]acancy in the board shall not impair 
the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the power of the board, and three 
members of the board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the board, except that 
two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first 
sentence hereof”).
182            the Labor & emPloymeNt Law forum       [vol. 2:2
when comparing these two statutes, it is clear that congress intended to: 1) 
grant the board the authority to delegate all of its powers to a three member 
group; 2) maintain the board’s authority to act despite a vacancy; and 3) 
increase the board’s quorum requirement to three, while explicitly stating that 
a delegee group’s quorum requirement was two.71 thus, a plain reading of the 
text would be that a group to which the board delegated authority needs only 
two members present to validly act. in New Process, the majority stated that 
if this is what congress intended when enacting the act,it could have added 
explicit, clarifying language to the statute that a delegee group could continue 
to act, despite the board’s membership falling below the quorum requirement.72 
rather, the majority argued that “a straightforward understanding of the text” 
evidences a requirement that the “delegee group . . . maintain a membership 
of three.”73 it is ironic that the majority considered reading a term such as 
“maintain” as “straightforward.”74
the majority also raised the concern that to adopt the government’s reading 
“allows two members to act as the board ad infinitum, which dramatically 
undercuts the significance of the Board quorum requirement by allowing its 
permanent circumvention.”75 this is perhaps the most intellectually dishonest 
statement posited by the majority because the delegation of authority to the 
two-member Board specified that all of the powers “would be revoked when 
the board’s membership returned to at least three members.”76 therefore, 
the court’s concern about the board’s ability to circumvent the statute is 
misplaced, since the circumvention could only last as long as the President 
and congress would allow through delays in the nomination and appointment 
process of additional board members.77
the majority’s argument, that the board incorrectly interpreted the act 
when it found that a two-member panel was permitted to issue decisions until 
additional members were confirmed to the Board, is misguided. A careful and 
plain reading of the 1935 and 1947 statutes together, along with the legislative 
history of the 1947 act, reveal that congress intended, and statutorily provided, 
for two-member delegations to act with all the powers of the board.
71. See 29 u.s.c. § 153 (2006).
72. See 130 s. ct. at 2644.
73. Id. at 2642 (emphasis added).
74. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2642 (2010).
75. Id. at 2639.
76. app. addendum to br. for Pet’r at 4(a), 5(a)(7)(a); see also New Process steel, 
130 s. ct. 2635 (2009).
77. See 130 s.ct. at 2639 (noting that Presidential recess appointments of new 
delegates automatically terminated the two member delegation). 
2012]                                     NEW PROCESS STEEL                                     183
effectS
the direct result of the New Process Steel decision is that six board 
decisions in which the board found against the employer were vacated.78 
however, the impact of this ruling is that all 595 decisions and orders of the 
schaumber-liebman board were essentially declared invalid.79 to gain a better 
understanding of the true impact of the Court’s ruling, one must analyze the 
types of cases, or perhaps more appropriately, the types of protected rights that 
the court’s decision affected. it must be noted that although the two-member 
Board issued nearly 600 decisions and orders, it was aware of the difficulties 
involved in a two-member, decision-making body. thus, the board strove “to 
issue decisions during this time period only in areas where the cases [were] 
more factually intensive or the law [was] more-clearly settled, and [had] 
avoided as far as possible controversial issues.”80
an analysis of the six cases directly affected by the New Process decision 
reveals that each case involved underlying claims of substantive rights 
of unions and that each of the cases were originally decided by the board 
 in favor of the unions.81 Five of the circuit courts upheld the challenged board 
decisions,82 while the d.c. circuit reversed the board’s decision and found 
in favor of the employer.83 lest one conclude that this was a mere anomaly, a 
more in depth analysis of the substantive rights cases reveals that the six cases 
were in representative of the pro-union decisions of the two-member board.84 
  
78. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2645 (2010); New Process 
steel, l.P., 353 N.l.r.b. 13 (2008);laurel baye healthcare of lake lanier, 352 N.l.r.b. 
30 (2008); Ne. land servs., 352 N.l.r.b. 89 (2008); snell island sNF, 352 N.l.r.b. 106 
(2008); Narricot indus., 353 N.l.r.b. 82 (2009); interstate bakeries corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 
14 (2008). 
79. See alvin P. blyer, Some Current Thinking at the Board from Brooklyn and 
Beyond, 28 hofStra LaB. & eMp. L.J. 175, 175 (2010) (noting the court’s decision 
invalidated more than 500 cases decided by the two member board between 2007- 2010 
because the board lacked authority to rule on these decisions).
80. robert bonsall & david J. murphy, The New”Obama National Labor Relations 
Board: Attack, Retreat or Both? eMp. L. inSt. 38th annuaL courSe handBook, ch.. 25 
(2009) (on file with author).
81. See New Process steel, 353 N.l.r.b. 13 (2008) (holding that employer violated 
section 8(a)(5) by failing to collectively bargain with union);  laurel baye healthcare, 
352 N.L.R.B. 30 (2008) (finding that employer used unfair labor tactics by failing to 
collectively bargain with union before making drastic policy changes); Ne. land servs., 
352 N.l.r.b. 89 (2008) (holding that employer violated § 8(a)(1) by using overly broad 
employee contracts); Snell Island SNF, 352 N.L.R.B. 106 (finding that employer used 
unfair labor tactics by refusing to bargain with union); 353 N.l.r.b. 82 (2009) (holding 
that employer violated § 8(a)(5) after refusing to recognize Union); Narricot Indus., 
353 N.L.R.B. 14 (2008) (finding that employer engaged in unfair labor practices by 
discriminating against an employee who had not joined a particular union). 
82. See teamsters local union No. 523 v. Nlrb, 590 F.3d 849 (10th cir. 2009) 
(affirming the Board’s decision against the employer); Narricot Indus., v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 
654 (4th cir. 2009); snell island sNF v. Nlrb, 568 F.3d 410 (2d cir. 2009); New Process 
steel, 564 F.3d 840 (7th cir. 2009); Ne. land servs., ltd. v. Nlrb, 560 F.3d 36 (1st cir. 
2009).
83. See 564 F.3d at 472-73 (holding that the two member board lacked a quorum 
and therefore lacked authority). 
84. See infra Part iv.
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although the two-member board issued 595 decisions and orders, this paper 
will focus on the 429 published decisions of the two-member board.85 of these 
decisions, eighty-seven cases dealt with issues other than allegations of employer 
violations of union/worker rights, namely, twenty-nine involved issues of 
union certification or decertification,86 thirty-nine involved claims by members 




85. melissa hart, Business-Like: The Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Labor and 
Employment Decisions, 14 eMp. rtS. & eMpL. poL’y J. 207, 207 (2010) (stating that while 
almost 600 board decisions were called into question after the New Process Steel decision, 
the practical consequences are not significantly damaging).
86. See Parsec, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 96 (2009); rockspring dev., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 
105 (2009); durham sch. servs., l.P., 353 N.l.r.b. 129 (2009); dlc corp, 353 
N.l.r.b. 130 (2009); reg’l emergency med. servs., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 20 (2009); 
goffstown truck ctr., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 49 (2009); chenega integrated sys., l.l.c., 
354 N.l.r.b. 56 (2009); sequoias Portola valley, 354 N.l.r.b. 74 (2009); colgate 
scaffolding & equip. corp., 354 N.l.r.b. 76 (2009); unisys corp., 354 N.l.r.b. 92 
(2009) cardinal health care, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 19 (2008); aircraft servs. int’l, inc., 352 
N.l.r.b 23 (2008); butler asphalt l.l.c, 352 N.l.r.b. 32 (2008); bally’s Park Place 
Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 51 (2008); Trump Plaza Assocs., 352 N.L.R.B. 76 (2008); Fresenius 
usa mfg., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 86 (2008); Foxwoods resort casino, 352 N.l.r.b. 92 
(2008); magic beans, llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 107 (2008); lily transp. corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 
121 (2008); coca-cola enters., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 123 (2008); Foster Poultry Farms, 352 
N.l.r.b. 136 (2008); anchor-harvey components, l.l.c, 352 N.l.r.b. 140 (2008); we 
care transp., l.l.c, 353 N.l.r.b. 9 (2008); air serv. corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 11 (2008); 
swissport usa, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 18 (2008);  PPg aerospace indus., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 
23 (2008); Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., Inc.,  353 N.L.R.B. 35 (2008);  Primeflight 
aviation servs., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 45 (2008); global aviation servs., l.l.c, 353 
N.l.r.b. 57 (2008).
87. See ssa marine inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 3 (2010); laborer’s local 1072, 355 N.l.r.b. 
6 (2010); elevator constructors local 8, 355 N.l.r.b. 13 (2010); operating eng’rs local 
324, 353 N.l.r.b. 85 (2009); elec. workers local 47, 353 N.l.r.b. 113 (2009); michigan 
laborer’s dist. council, 353 N.l.r.b. 114 (2009); am. Postal workers union area local 
984, 353 N.l.r.b. 124 (2009); stagehands referral serv., 354 N.l.r.b. 7 (2009); iron 
workers, local 378, 354 N.l.r.b. 19 (2009); elec. workers local 71, 354 N.l.r.b. 46 
(2009); Plasterers local 262, 354 N.l.r.b. 47 (2009);teamsters local 886, 354 N.l.r.b. 
52 (2009); chicago reg’l council of carpenters, 354 N.l.r.b. 73 (2009); elec. workers 
local 42, 354 N.l.r.b. 78 (2009); operating eng’rs local 150, 354 N.l.r.b. 89 (2009); 
carpenters local 1780, 354 N.l.r.b. 101 (2009); carpenters, 354 N.l.r.b. 104 (2009); 
operating eng’rs local 150, 354 N.l.r.b. 112 (2009); laborers local 1184, 354 N.l.r.b. 
113 (2009); carpenters local 43, 354 N.l.r.b. 122 (2009); mason tenders local union 
# 388, 352 N.l.r.b. 2 (2008); int’l alliance of theatrical stage emps., 352 N.l.r.b. 7 
(2008); aircraft servs. int’l, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 23 (2008); united workers of am., 352 
N.l.r.b. 45 (2008); int’l union of operating eng’rs, 352 N.l.r.b. 54 (2008); int’l ass’n 
of machinists and aerospace workers, district lodge 776, 352 N.l.r.b. 57 (2008); int’l 
union of operating eng’rs, 352 N.l.r.b. 77 (2008); Nat’l Postal mail handlers union, 
352 N.l.r.b. 91 (2008); Puget sound area local #298, 352 N.l.r.b. 98 (2008); local 
one-l, 352 N.l.r.b. 114 (2008); laborers int’l union of N. am., local union 578, 352 
N.l.r.b. 118 (2008); lorge sch., 352 N.l.r.b. 119 (2008); elec. workers local 3, 352 
N.l.r.b. 124 (2008); int’l alliance of theatrical stage emps., 352 N.l.r.b. 128 (2008); 
auto workers local 155, 352 N.l.r.b. 130 (2008); graphic commc’n local 17b, 353 
N.l.r.b. 4 (2008); interstate bakeries corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 14 (2008); Food & commercial 
workers local 4, 353 N.l.r.b. 47 (2008); laborers local 6, 353 N.l.r.b. 62 (2008).
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and nineteen involved purely procedural issues.88 the remaining 342 published 
cases involved various substantive rights of workers and can be broken down 
into the following four categories according to the underlying claims of each 
case: 1) violations of 8(a)(1) only; 2) violations of 8(a)(3) or a combination of 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations; 3) violations of 8(a)(5) or a combination of 8(a)
(1) and 8(a)(5) violations; or 4) a combination of alleged violations of multiple 
sections of the act.89  
to gain a better perspective on each of these categories, and, thus, a true 
understanding of the impact of the court’s New Process Steel decision, this 
paper will classify the decisions within each category according to whether 
the board’s decision favored the union, the employer, or was a split decision 
in which the board resolved some claims in favor of the union and others in 
favor of the employer. such an analysis reveals a strong pattern of the board’s 
decisions and thus, perhaps, a possible motivation for the court’s New Process 
Steel decision.90 
the act sets forth the rights and obligations of both employers and labor 
unions.91 Generally, claims brought before the Board deal with certification 
elections or unfair labor practices.92 Section 8(a) sets forth the specific 
actions of employers deemed to be unfair labor practices and, thus, result in 
the board imposing an appropriate remedy, such as an order of backpay,93 
 
 
88. See expert elec., inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 12 (2010); sleepy’s inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 
21 (2010); cNN am., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 94 (2009); ss1 entm’t, l.l.c., 353 N.l.r.b. 
115 (2009); Horizon Contract Glazing, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 118 (2009); Metro Demolition 
contracting corp., 354 N.l.r.b. 48 (2009); milwaukee city ctr., l.l.c, 354 N.l.r.b. 
77 (2009)); cNN am. inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 40 (2008); N.y. Newspaper Printing Pressmen’s 
union No. 2, 352 N.l.r.b. 63 (2008); cNN am., inc. 352 N.l.r.b. 64 (2008); bashas’ 
Food city, 352 N.l.r.b. 82 (2008); cNN am., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 85 (2008); toering elec. 
co., 352 N.l.r.b. 102 (2008); honeywell elec. materials mfg., l.l.c., 352 N.l.r.b. 
135 (2008); carson trailer, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 144 (2008); Faurecia auto. seating, 353 
N.l.r.b. 5 (2008); Fluor daniel, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 15 (2008); shane steel Processing, 
inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 58 (2008); long island head start child dev. servs., 353 N.l.r.b. 70 
(2008).
89. See 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(1) (2006) (preventing employer interference in the section 
7 rights attributed to employees); 29 u.s.c. § 158 (a)(3) (2006)  (preventing employers 
from encouraging or discouraging employees from participation in unions); 29 u.s.c. 
§ 153(a)(5) (2006) (requiring employers to collectively bargain with employee’s union 
representatives).
90. See linda hamilton Krieger and susan t. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 caL. L. rev. 
997, 1002 (2006) (discussing how judicial decisions can be affected by the judge’s own 
perception of real world models of fairness in employment practices).
91. National labor relations (wagner) act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 151- 69 (1953).
92. Philip m. borger, Hold the Salt: Should Non-Genuine Applicants be Treated as 
Employees Under the NLRA? Toering Electric Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 18, 2007 WL 2899733 
(Sept. 29, 2007), 77 u. cin. L. rev. 1247, 1250 (spring 2009) (describing the board’s role 
in remedying unfair labor practices under the Nlra).
93. See aneco inc. v. Nlrb, 285 F.3d 326, 329 (4th cir. 2002) (discussing the 
board’s ability to order backpay for an employer’s unlawful labor practices as a way to 
restore the employee to a pre-discrimination position). 
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reinstatement,94 expungement of written disciplinary reports from personnel 
file,95 or an affirmative order to bargain.96
8(a)(1) violations
section 8(a)(1) of the act prohibits an employer from “interfer[ing] with, 
restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed 
by section 7.”97 section 7 rights include:
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, 
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the 
right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that 
such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in 
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in 
section 8(a)(3).  
29 u.s.c. § 157 (2006). the two-member board decided thirty-nine cases 
involving allegations of 8(a)(1) violations, with thirty decisions favoring 
the unions,98 three decisions favoring employers,99 and six split decisions.100 
 
94. See Golden Day Sch., Inc. v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 834, 841 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding 
that in certain circumstances “reinstatement [is] clearly necessary to vindicate the 
purposes of the act, deter future violations, and preserve industrial peace”).
95. See wal-mart stores, inc. v. Nlrb, 400 F.3d 1093, 1100 (8th cir. 2005) 
(upholding but while still  limiting the Nlrb’s order expunging references to 
disciplinary actions for protected activity from the employee’s personnel file). 
96. Nlrb v. goya Foods of Fla., 525 F.3d 1117, 1133 (11th cir. 2008) (justifying 
an affirmative order to bargain because Goya’s unfair labor practices had hindered 
union’s ability to successfully negotiate).
97. 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(1) (2006).
98. See css healthcare servs., inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 5 (2010); bryant health ctr., inc., 
353 N.l.r.b. 80 (2009); white oak manor, 353 N.l.r.b. 83 (2009); mcelroy coal co., 353 
N.l.r.b. 108 (2009); woodbury Partners, l.l.c., 353 N.l.r.b. 112 (2009); tom arand, 
353 N.l.r.b. 128 (2009); Family healthcare, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 29 (2009); hearn constr., 
354 N.l.r.b. 37 (2009); tex. dental ass’n, 354 N.l.r.b. 57 (2009); coastal insulation 
corp., 354 N.l.r.b. 70 (2009); Fortuna enters., l.P., 354 N.l.r.b. 95 (2009); tex. 
dental ass’n, 354 N.l.r.b. 107 (2009);trump marina assocs., 354 N.l.r.b. 123 (2009); 
Knightsbridge heights rehab care ctr., 352 N.l.r.b. 5 (2008); biosource landscaping 
servs., l.l.c., 352 N.l.r.b. 6 (2008); mega Force Prods. corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 27 (2008); 
Crowne Plaza Hotel, 352 N.L.R.B. 55 (2008); Windstream Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. 68 (2008); 
dickens, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 84 (2008); tecumseh Packaging solutions, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 
87 (2008); Ne. land servs. 352 N.l.r.b. 89 (2008); loyalhanna care assoc., 352 N.l.r.b. 
105 (2008); stanadyne auto. corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 117 (2008); walgreen co., 352 N.l.r.b. 
137 (2008); sacred heart med. ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 19 (2008); case Farms of N.c. inc., 
353 N.l.r.b. 26 (2008); alton h. Piester, l.l.c., 353 N.l.r.b. 33 (2008); Forest hills 
supermarket, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 37 (2008); ashley Furniture indus., 353 N.l.r.b. 71 
(2008); harco asphalt Paving, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 74 (2008).
99. See akal sec., inc. 354 N.l.r.b. 11 (2009); corr. corp. of am., 354 N.l.r.b. 
105 (2009); mega Force Prods. corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 70 (2008).
100. See saigon gourmet rest., inc. 353 N.l.r.b. 110 (2009); venetian casino 
report, l.l.c., 354 N.l.r.b. 9 (2009); susan oles, dmd, 354 N.l.r.b. 13 (2009); 
superior Protection, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 12 (2009); cnty. waste of ulster, 354 N.l.r.b. 54 
(2009); brighton retail, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 62 (2009). 
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these cases involved allegations of a variety of unfair labor practices, 
including allegations of using threats to deter union representation or strikes,101 
prohibiting communication regarding unions,102 or creating the impression of 
surveillance to discourage participation in or support for the union.103 thus, in 
deciding cases within this category, the two-member board found, in whole or 
in part, that the employers had violated section 8(a)(1) of the act in thirty-three 
out of the thirty-six cases that dealt with substantive rights of the unions. 
Violations of Section 8(a)(3) or Sections 8(a)(1) & 8(a)(3)
section 8(a)(3) of the act provides that an employer commits an unfair labor 
practice if it discriminates “in regard[s] to hir[ing] or tenure of employment 
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization.”104 the two-member board decided 
eighty-seven cases involving violations of 8(a)(3), or combined claims of 8(a) 























101. See, e.g., biosource landscaping servs, 352 N.l.r.b. 6 (2008) (threatening plant 
closure if union voted in as representative); Kingsbridge heights, 352 N.l.r.b. 5 (2008) 
(threatening to delay reinstatement if employees went on strike).
102. See, e.g., Forest hills Family Foods, 352 N.l.r.b. 37 (2008) (denying union 
access to property); sacred heart med. ctr., 352 N.l.r.b. 19 (2008).
103. See, e.g., susan oles, dmd, 354 N.l.r.b. 13 (2009) (interrogating and 
threatening employees about their protected activities by implying that their activities 
were under surveillance); harco asphalt Paving, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 74 (2008) (threatening 
to call or actually contacting the police to remove union representatives, photographing 
representatives, and claiming it would obtain restraining orders).
104. 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(3) (1988). 
105. Id. at § 158(a)(1)-(3).
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the unions,106 ten decisions favoring the employers,107 and twenty-three split 
decisions.108 these cases involved a variety of unfair labor practices, 
including refusing to rehire union workers,109 refusing to hire union 
 
 
106. See universal laundries & linen supply, 355 N.l.r.b. 17 (2010); transp. 
solutions, inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 22 (2010); cadence innovation, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 77 
(2009); Post tension of Nv, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 87 (2009); mid-states express, 353 
N.l.r.b. 91 (2009); Paint am. servs., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 100 (2009); ridgeview indus., 
353 N.L.R.B. 119 (2009); Diversified Enters., 353 N.L.R.B. 120 (2009); MSK Cargo/
King express, 353 N.l.r.b. 121 (2009); extreme servs. corp., 354 N.l.r.b. 6 (2009); 
los angeles airport hilton hotel & towers, 354 N.l.r.b. 17 (2009); camelot terrace, 
inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 24 (2009); cadence innovation, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 28 (2009); inland 
Press, 354 N.l.r.b. 36 (2009); John succi gen. contractors, 354 N.l.r.b. 38 (2009); Ky 
river med. ctr., 354 N.l.r.b. 42 (2009); vishal constr., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 43 (2009); 
legacy health sys., 354 N.l.r.b. 45 (2009); Powellton coal co., 354 N.l.r.b. 60 (2009); 
Phoenix Finishing, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 64 (2009); regal health & rehab ctr., inc., 354 
N.l.r.b. 71 (2009); regency grande Nursing & rehab. ctr., 354 N.l.r.b. 75 (2009); 
global sign indus., 354 N.l.r.b. 81 (2009); Parksite grp., 354 N.l.r.b. 90 (2009); 
empire state weeklies, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 91 (2009); signman, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 96 
(2009); gerhard’s appliances, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 124 (2009); aluminum casting & eng’g 
co., 352 N.l.r.b. 1 (2008); hwh trading corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 4 (2008); Found. coal w., 
352 N.l.r.b. 22 (2008); Paint am. servs., 352 N.l.r.b. 31 (2008); Ky river med. ctr., 
352 N.l.r.b. 33 (2008); mcburney corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 35 (2008); midwest generation, 
eme, llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 36 (2008); mays elec. co., 352 N.l.r.b. 49 (2008); solartec, 
inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 52 (2008); Frye electric, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 53 (2008); gelita usa inc., 
352 N.l.r.b. 59 (2008); Pennant Foods co., 352 N.l.r.b. 62 (2008); glen rock ham, 
352 N.l.r.b. 69 (2008); allied mech., 352 N.l.r.b. 110 (2008); barstow cmty. hosp., 
352 N.l.r.b. 125 (2008); John t. Jones constr. co., 352 N.l.r.b. 126 (2008); m.v.m., 
 inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 133 (2008); Jerry ryce builders, 352 N.l.r.b. 143 (2008); air mgmt. 
servs., 352 N.l.r.b. 145 (2008); camelot terrace, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 20 (2008); adb 
util. contractors, 353 N.l.r.b. 21 (2008); sawgrass auto mall, 353 N.l.r.b. 40 (2008); 
united Plasterers, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 44 (2008); st. george warehouse, 353 N.l.r.b. 50 
(2008); midwest Psychological ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 51 (2008); laborers local 6 (anderson 
interiors), 353 N.l.r.b. 64 (2008); wilkett enters., llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 72 (2008).
107. See tower auto. operations usa i, llc, 355 N.l.r.b. 1 (2010); Fluor daniel, 
inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 79 (2009); trade Fair supermarkets, 354 N.l.r.b. 16 (2009); tinney 
rebar servs., 354 N.l.r.b. 61 (2009); murrill elec., llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 96 (2008); blue 
diamond growers, 353 N.l.r.b. 6 (2008); domsey trading corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 12 
(2008); Horizon Contract Glazing, Inc., 353 N.L.R.B. 16 (2008); New York Post, 353 
N.l.r.b. 30 (2008); Faurecia exhaust sys., 353 N.l.r.b. 34 (2008).
108. See cintas corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 81 (2009); green valley manor, llc, 353 
N.l.r.b. 92 (2009); trump marina hotel casino, 353 N.l.r.b. 93 (2009); loparex llc, 
353 N.l.r.b. 126 (2009); united Plasterers, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 55 (2009); action carting 
envtl. servs., 354 N.l.r.b. 84 (2009); dPi New england, 354 N.l.r.b. 94 (2009); 
starbucks coffee co., 354 N.l.r.b. 99 (2009);  allstate Power vac, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 
111 (2009); desert springs hosp. med. ctr., 352 N.l.r.b. 16 (2008); baptista’s bakery, 
352 N.l.r.b. 72 (2008); Piner’s NaPa ambulance serv., 352 N.l.r.b. 74 (2008); rcc 
Fabricators, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 88 (2008); wal-mart stores, 352 N.l.r.b. 103 (2008); 
mcburney corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 112 (2008); e. buffet rest., 352 N.l.r.b. 116 (2008); 
inn at Fox hollow, 352 N.l.r.b. 127 (2008); Post tension of Nv, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 131 
(2008); honeywell elec. materials mfg., llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 135 (2008); hanson material 
serv. corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 10 (2008); the cont’l grp., 353 N.l.r.b. 31 (2008); dr. rico 
Perez Prods., 353 N.L.R.B. 43 (2008); Chinese Daily News, 353 N.L.R.B. 66 (2008).
109. See, e.g., Vishal Constr., Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. 43 (2009) (finding that the employer 
had discriminated against union workers with poor rehire practices); Post tension of Nv, 
inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 87 (2009) (holding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the 
Act by, among other things, threatening striking workers with difficult rehire processes). 
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members,110 or discharging members.111 thus,  the two-member board found 
that the employers violated section 8(a)(3) or sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the 
act in seventy-seven out of the eighty-seven cases dealing with these rights.
vioLationS of 8(a)(5) or coMBinationS of 8(a)(1) & 8(a)(5)
section 8(a)(5) provides that an employer commits an unfair labor 
practice if it refuses “to bargain collectively with the representatives 
of his employees.” the two-member board decided 159 cases within this 
this category, resulting in 135 decisions in favor of the unions,112 
110. See, e.g., John succi gen. contractors, 354 N.l.r.b. 38 (2009); inland Press, 354 
N.L.R.B. 36 (2009) (finding an employer’s refusal to hire a union worker violated Section 
8(a)(3)).
111. See, e.g., trump marina hotel casino, 353 N.l.r.b. 93 (2009) (holding that the 
employer’s threat to fire union members violated Section 8(a)(1)); Mid-States Express, Inc., 
353 N.L.R.B. 91 (2009) (finding that the employer’s threat to close the plant constituted a 
violation of the section 8(a)(1)).
112. See lbe, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 125 (2010); cg’s law & Janitorial serv., 354 
N.L.R.B. 126 (2010); Fred Meyer Stores, 354 N.L.R.B. 127 (2010); Am. Benefit Corp., 
354 N.l.r.b. 129 (2010); abb inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 2 (2010); holcomb & hoke mfg. co., 
355 N.l.r.b. 4 (2010); aloft chicago o’hare, 355 N.l.r.b. 9 (2010); mccarthy constr. 
co., 355 N.l.r.b. 10 (2010); aramark educ. servs., 355 N.l.r.b. 11 (2010); adF, inc., 
355 N.l.r.b. 14 (2010); drawn metal Prods. div. co., 355 N.l.r.b. 15 (2010); New 
country audi, inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 16 (2010); Narricot indus., 353 N.l.r.b. 82 (2009); 
sheehy enterprises, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 84 (2009); coastal cargo co., 353 N.l.r.b. 86 
(2009); triple a Fire Prot., 353 N.l.r.b. 88 (2009); asher candy, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 
95 (2009); cardi corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 97 (2009); lakeland Neurocare ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 
106 (2009); Resistflame Acquisition Co., 353 N.L.R.B. 107 (2009); Essex Valley Visiting 
Nurses ass’n, 353 N.l.r.b. 109 (2009); N. oakland med. ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 111 
(2009); s. Power co., 353 N.l.r.b. 116 (2009); Five star interiors, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 
122 (2009); divi carina bay resort, 353 N.l.r.b. 131 (2009); PdK invs., llc, 354 
N.l.r.b. 1 (2009); monmouth care ctr., 354 N.l.r.b. 2 (2009); wrangell seafoods, inc., 
354 N.l.r.b. 3 (2009); long beach Press-telegram, 354 N.l.r.b. 4 (2009); New york 
Presbyterian hosp., 354 N.l.r.b. 5 (2009); hartford head start agency, 354 N.l.r.b. 
15 (2009); rochelle waste disposal, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 18 (2009); m&b servs., 354 
N.L.R.B. 21 (2009); Hartzheim Dodge Hayward, 354 N.L.R.B. 22 (2009); Mays Printing 
Co., 354 N.L.R.B. 23 (2009); Santa Cruz Skilled Nursing Ctr., 354 N.L.R.B. 25 (2009); 
eagle ray electric co., 354 N.l.r.b. 27 (2009); cook duPage transp. co., 354 N.l.r.b. 
31 (2009); cox ohio Publ’g, 354 N.l.r.b. 32 (2009); a & c healthcare servs., 354 
N.l.r.b. 33 (2009); spartan indus., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 34 (2009); Postal serv., 354 
N.l.r.b. 58 (2009); liberty source w, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 59 (2009); Fuel sys., inc., 354 
N.l.r.b. 63 (2009); shasta reg’l med. ctr., 354 N.l.r.b. 65 (2009); courtesy bus co., 
inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 66 (2009); dodge Printing, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 67 (2009); Fremont 
med. ctr. & rideout mem’l hosp., 354 N.l.r.b. 68 (2009); thoele asphalt Paving, 354 
N.L.R.B. 69 (2009); Mercedes-Benz of Orlando, 354 N.L.R.B. 72 (2009); Compucom 
sys., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 87 (2009); Fred meyer stores, 354 N.l.r.b. 88 (2009); harmon 
Auto Glass, 354 N.L.R.B. 98 (2009); Hartzheim Dodge, Inc., 354 N.L.R.B. 100 (2009); 
aPs events, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 102 (2009); supreme delivery serv., 354 N.l.r.b. 103 
(2009); compass grp. N. am., 354 N.l.r.b. 106 (2009); eagle ray electric co., 354 
 N.l.r.b. 109 (2009); spring air w., llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 110 (2009); crete cold storage, 
354 N.l.r.b. 114 (2009); lbe, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 115 (2009); bristol hosp. ems, 354 
N.l.r.b. 116 (2009); e.a. sween co., 354 N.l.r.b. 117 (2009); columbus components 
grp., llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 118 (2009); aerosol specialties, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 119 (2009); 
Countywide Landfill, 352 N.L.R.B. 3 (2008); Windstream Corp., 352 N.L.R.B. 9 (2008); 
Proper steel erectors, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 11 (2008); Publ’n Printing co., 352 N.l.r.b. 12 
(2008); Quanta, 352 N.l.r.b. 13 (2008); Nat’l broad. co., 352 N.l.r.b. 15 (2008); lorge 
 sch., 352 N.l.r.b. 17 (2008); ralph’s grocery co., 352 N.l.r.b. 18 (2008);  clarke mfg
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twelve decisions in favor of the employers,113and twelve split decisions.114 
these cases involved allegations of conduct such as the employer refusing to 
bargain with the exclusive bargaining agent of its employees,115 or employers 
. , 
352 N.l.r.b. 25 (2008); N. am. linen, llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 26 (2008); shane steel 
Processing, 352 N.l.r.b. 28 (2008); area trade bindery co., 352 N.l.r.b. 29 (2008); 
laurel baye healthcare of lake lanier, llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 30 (2008); Nat’l Fabco mfg., 
352 N.L.R.B. 37 (2008); California Gas Transport, 352 N.L.R.B. 38 (2008); Casino Aztar, 
352 N.l.r.b. 41 (2008); seneca Falls iga, 352 N.l.r.b. 43 (2008); coastal int’l sec., 
inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 46 (2008); washington sprinkler co., 352 N.l.r.b. 48 (2008); abs 
heating & cooling, 352 N.l.r.b. 50 (2008); bashas’ Food city, 352 N.l.r.b. 56 (2008); 
tech valley Printing, 352 N.l.r.b. 58 (2008); hosp. Pavia Perea, 352 N.l.r.b. 60 (2008); 
essex valley visiting Nurses ass’n, 352 N.l.r.b. 61 (2008); hamilton sunstrand, 352 
N.l.r.b. 65 (2008); legal servs. of N. california, 352 N.l.r.b. 66 (2008); benjamin 
Franklin Plumbing, 352 N.l.r.b. 71 (2008); air climate sys., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 75 
(2008); Palm beach metro transp., llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 79 (2008); am. standard cos., 352 
N.l.r.b. 80 (2008); tech valley Printing, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 81 (2008); allied mech., 352 
N.L.R.B. 83 (2008); Talmadge Park, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 90 (2008); Bloomfield Health Care 
ctr., 352 N.l.r.b. 94 (2008); bally’s atl. city, 352 N.l.r.b. 95 (2008); alta vista reg’l 
hosp., 352 N.l.r.b. 100 (2008); stockbridge country manor, 352 N.l.r.b. 104 (2008); 
shores acres rehab. & Nursing ctr., 352 N.l.r.b. 106 (2008); goya Foods of Fl, 352 
N.l.r.b. 109 (2008); First transit, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 111 (2008); Proper steel erectors, 
Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 113 (2008); Verizon N., Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 120 (2008); Structure Tone, 
inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 132 (2008); town & country Plumbing & heating, 352 N.l.r.b. 139 
(2008); Trump Plaza Hotel & Casino, 352 N.L.R.B. 146 (2008); Union-Tribune Publ’g Co., 
353 N.l.r.b. 2 (2008); metro. home health care inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 3 (2008); carambola 
beach resort, 353 N.l.r.b. 8 (2008); New Process steel, lP, 353 N.l.r.b. 13 (2008); 
Postar coal co., 353 N.l.r.b. 17 (2008); beverage dispensing sys., 353 N.l.r.b. 22 
(2008); laurel bay health & rehab. ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 24 (2008); New Process steel, lP, 
353 N.L.R.B. 25 (2008); Wilshire Plaza Hotel, 353 N.L.R.B. 29 (2008); Foxwoods Resort 
casino, 353 N.l.r.b. 32 (2008); rochelle waste disposal, 353 N.l.r.b. 38 (2008); lily 
Transp. Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. 42 (2008); Countywide Landfill, 353 N.L.R.B. 49 (2008); 
sPe util. contractors, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 52 (2008); saint mary home, 353 N.l.r.b. 
53 (2008); austin Printing co., 353 N.l.r.b. 54 (2008); First student, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 
55 (2008); Five star interiors, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 56 (2008); shane steel Processing, 
llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 59 (2008); Prof’l Janitorial serv. of houston, 353 N.l.r.b. 65 (2008); 
agencia de Publicaciones de Puerto rico, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 68 (2008); Kingsbridge 
heights rehab. & care ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 69 (2008); acme Press, 353 N.l.r.b. 73 (2008); 
bentonite Performance minerals, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 75 (2008); racetrack Food servs., 
inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 76 (2008).
113. See Nv energy, inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 7 (2010); Ny Post, 353 N.l.r.b. 67 (2008); 
aramark corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 98 (2009); amalgamated credit union, 354 N.l.r.b. 30 
(2009); brink’s usa, 354 N.l.r.b. 41 (2009); myers investigative & sec. servs., 354 
N.l.r.b. 51 (2009); long island head start child dev. servs., 354 N.l.r.b. 82 (2009); 
Knight Protective servs., 354 N.l.r.b. 86 (2009); Pabst theater Found., 354 N.l.r.b. 121 
(2009); cimato bros., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 99 (2008); catskill mech. corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 
101 (2008); Postal serv., 352 N.l.r.b. 122 (2008).
114. See regency heritage Nursing & rehab. ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 103 (2009); chrysler, 
llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 128 (2010); Kieft bros., inc., 355 N.l.r.b. 19 (2010); capital iron 
works co., 355 N.l.r.b. 20 (2010); medco health solutions of spokane, 352 N.l.r.b. 
78 (2008); sPe util. contractors, llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 97 (2008); whitesell corp., 352 
N.l.r.b. 138 (2008); Quebecor world mt. morris, 353 N.l.r.b. 1 (2008); Positive 
electric enters., 353 N.l.r.b. 27 (2008); tNt logistics N. am., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 41 
(2008); Pavilions at Forrestal, 353 N.l.r.b. 60 (2008); harmon auto glass, 352 N.l.r.b. 
24 (2008) (holding that respondent withheld information from the union and failed to 
properly bargain prior to changing employment conditions).
115. See, e.g., a&c healthcare servs., 354 N.l.r.b. 33 (2009) (holding that after 
purchase through a bankruptcy auction, the new interim operations manager informed 
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making unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment.116 in 
deciding cases within this category, the two-member board found, in whole or 
in part, that the employers had violated section 8(a)(5) or sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(5) of the act in 147 out of the 159 cases dealing with these substantive 
rights of the unions.
Allegations of Violations of Multiple Sections of the Act
the fourth category includes the remainder of the substantive rights cases 
that included allegations of violations of multiple sections of the act.  the two-
member Board decided fifty-seven cases involving allegations of violations of 
multiple sections of the act resulting in denial of substantive rights, which 
resulted in thirty-eight decisions in favor of the unions,117 four decisions 
favoring the employer,118 and fifteen split decisions.119 when deciding cases 
all individuals employed by the purchased company that they would continue their work 
on a ninety day probationary basis with the same wages but no health or other benefits, 
which modified their current wage, hour, and benefit agreements); M&B Servs., Inc., 354 
N.L.R.B. 21 (2009) (finding respondent company failed to pay employees a wage increase 
in adherence with the current collective bargaining agreement without prior notice to the 
union, and without providing the union with the opportunity to bargain for the wage 
increase). 
116. See, e.g., amalgamated credit union, 354 N.l.r.b. 30 (2009); mays Printing 
co., 354 N.l.r.b. 23 (2009) (positing that unfair labor practices existed against employer 
who continued to deduct health insurance premiums from employees’ paychecks without 
providing the health insurance benefits described in the 2007–2010 collective-bargaining 
agreement).
117. See Copper Craft Plumbing, 354 N.L.R.B. 108 (2009); Atlas Refinery, Inc., 354 
N.l.r.b. 120 (2010); Quanta, 355 N.l.r.b. 8 (2010); cnty. waste of ulster, 353 N.l.r.b. 
89 (2009); spectrum health-Kent cmty. campus, 353 N.l.r.b. 99 (2009); iberia rd. 
markings, corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 101 (2009); manhattan health clean, 353 N.l.r.b. 104 
(2009); Ksm indus., 353 N.l.r.b. 117 (2009); sPe util. contractors, llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 
123 (2009); turtle bay resorts, 353 N.l.r.b. 127 (2009); stevens creek chrysler Jeep 
dodge, 353 N.l.r.b. 132 (2009); cherry auto Parts, 354 N.l.r.b. 10 (2009); superior 
Prot., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 12 (2009); greensburg mfg., 354 N.l.r.b. 35 (2009); standard 
Plumbing & appliance co., 354 N.l.r.b. 40 (2009); Fuel sys., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 44 
(2009); beaird indus., 354 N.l.r.b. 50 (2009); seafood wholesalers, ltd., 354 N.l.r.b. 
53 (2009); mammoth coal co., 354 N.l.r.b. 83 (2009); raymond interior sys., 354 
N.l.r.b. 85 (2009); regency grande Nursing & rehab. ctr., 354 N.l.r.b. 93 (2009); N 
& r Quality care, llc, 354 N.l.r.b. 97 (2009); san luis trucking, inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 
34 (2008); Bloomfield Health Care Ctr., 352 N.L.R.B. 39 (2008); SFO Good-Nite Inn, 
llc, 352 N.l.r.b. 42 (2008); am Prop. holding corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 44 (2008); coastal 
int’l sec., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 47 (2008); wheeling brake block mfg. co., 352 N.l.r.b. 
67 (2008); engineered steel concepts, 352 N.l.r.b. 73 (2008); dedicated servs., 352 
N.l.r.b. 93 (2008); a.J. mech., inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 108 (2008); wayneview care ctr., 
352 N.l.r.b. 129 (2008); gFc crane consultants, 352 N.l.r.b. 142 (2008); eugene 
iovine, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 36 (2008); catskill mountain mech. corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 46 
(2008); wiers int’l trucks, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 48 (2008); bsc dev. buF, 353 N.l.r.b. 
63 (2008) laborers’ local 731 (tully constr.), 352 N.l.r.b. 20 (2008) (relying on 
collective bargaining agreements to hold that the employees represented by the laborers 
and engineers union were able to continue performing the disputed work).
118. See stepan co., 352 N.l.r.b. 14 (2008) (holding for the employer because the 
information requested by the union was not for bargaining purposes, but rather to further 
unfair labor practice litigation); see also scenic hills Nursing ctr., 353 N.l.r.b. 102 
(2009); siro die casting, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 8 (2009); laborers local 79 (Jmh dev.), 354 
N.l.r.b. 14 (2009).
119. See PPg aerospace indus., 355 N.l.r.b. 18 (2010); garner/morrison, llc, 353 
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within this category, the two-member board found, in whole or in part, that the 
employers had violated at least one section of the Act in fifty-three out of the 
fifty-seven cases dealing with these substantive rights of the unions.
therefore, when considering all of the substantive rights cases, the two-
member board found that the employers had violated, in whole or in part, the 
substantive rights of the unions in 313 out of 342 cases. in other words, the 
two-member board found employer violations of union/worker rights in nearly 
ninety-two percent of the cases it decided, and, therefore, the court’s New 
Process Steel decision, in overturning these earlier decisions by the Nlrb, 
can be seen as a victory for employers.120 when viewed from this perspective, 
any analysis of the court’s decision in New Process Steel must address the fact 
that the decision has strong ramifications for the rights of unions and for the 
labor movement as a whole. therefore, one must inquire as to whether these 
results were a factor in the court’s decision.
cauSeS
as straightforward as it may be to identify the direct and indirect effects 
of the court’s decision, the causes of the decision are a bit more ambiguous. 
there are several possible explanations for the court’s reasoning in New 
Process Steel. to understand the possible motivations behind the court’s 
decision, it is necessary to look not only at what the court said, but also at 
what it did not say, and perhaps more importantly, who was instrumental in 
drafting the majority’s decision. First, it must be recognized that the case 
involved an administrative agency’s interpretation of its regulating statute. as 
such, it is essential to examine the court’s silence on the Chevron doctrine.121 
additionally, this opinion was authored by Justice stevens and joined by 
Justice scalia, two Justices who have consistently been at odds over cases 
involving an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute and the proper 
approach for the judiciary to utilize in analyzing legislation.122 second, the 
N.l.r.b. 78 (2009); Palmer house hilton, 353 N.l.r.b. 90 (2009); spurlino materials, 
llc, 353 N.l.r.b. 125 (2009); galicks, inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 39 (2009); alan ritchey, 
inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 79 (2009); Quickway transp., inc., 354 N.l.r.b. 80 (2009); hercules 
drawn steel corp., 352 N.l.r.b. 10 (2008); Postal serv., 352 N.l.r.b. 115 (2008); alcoa, 
inc., 352 N.l.r.b. 141 (2008); dietrich indus., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 7 (2008); hanson 
aggregates bmc, inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 28 (2008); united Parcel serv., inc., 353 N.l.r.b. 
39 (2008); matros automated elec. constr. corp., 353 N.l.r.b. 61 (2008); laborers 
Local 169 (Frehner Constr. Co.), 352 N.L.R.B. 8 (2008) (finding that the Union refused to 
collectively bargain with the company).
120. C.f., Nguyen v. u.s., 539 u.s. 69 (2003) (allowing an appeal from a criminal 
conviction on the grounds that the three judge panel was improper when one judge was not 
an article iii judge). the judgments vacated by New Process Steel opens up the possibility 
that employers in those cases will repudiate negotiations and contracts ordered by the 
board.
121. chevron u.s.a., inc. v. Natural res. def. council, 467 u.s. 837 (1984) (holding 
that the agency, through its varying interpretations of the word “source,” consistently 
viewed the term flexibly).  It was not the agency, but rather the Court of Appeals, that read 
the statute inflexibly. Since Congress did not provide a definition for “source,” the Court 
believed that it should not, either. 
122. See Nlrb v. Ky river cmty. care, inc., 532 u.s. 706, 725 (2001) (differing 
in part from Justice scalia’s majority opinion, primarily on the bases of scalia’s non-
deference to the board’s interpretation of ambiguous language in the act and stating that 
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decision greatly impacted and stripped away the rights of unions, causing one 
to examine whether the court was motivated by an anti-labor attitude. 
Possible Cause #1 – Narrowing of Chevron Doctrine
Justice stevens, writing for the majority in Chevron, explained how the 
judiciary should approach questions of the legitimacy of decisions made by 
administrative agencies.123 according to stevens, this Chevron deference 
analysis proceeds, first with 
“the question whether congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.  if the intent of congress is clear, that is the end of 
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of congress.  if, however, the court 
determines congress has not directly addressed the precise question 
at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on 
the statue, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative 
interpretation.  rather if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect 
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”124 
the majority opinion in New Process Steel, written by Justice stevens, based 
its decision on the statutory construction analysis of the taft-hartley act of 
1947 as it amended the wagner act of 1935.125 therefore, it is surprising that 
steven’s decision is silent in regards to the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference 
to administrative agency decisions. indeed, the entire analysis of New Process 
steel revolved around whether the Nlrb, an executive agency, was permitted 
to interpret the Nlra.126 the fact that stevens was the Justice who crafted the 
Chevron doctrine in 1984 is only part of the peculiarity of the New Process 
Steel decision.  
Justice stevens’ opinion in Chevron can be seen as a landmark decision as 
it was instrumental in establishing a legal framework, largely governed by 
the court’s deference to an agency’s role in interpreting and implementing 
statutes. however, there has been confusion among federal courts as to “when, 
and how, to apply the two-step Chevron analysis.”127 in fact, during this time 
“there’s been a battle between its author, Justice stevens, and Justice scalia 
about the decision’s significance.”128 
“it is settled law that the Nlrb’s interpretation of ambiguous language in the National 
labor relations act is entitled to deference”). 
123. See 467 u.s. at 837.
124. Id. at 843.
125. See New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2639-45 (2010).
126. The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Leading Cases, 124 harv. L. rev. 380, 387 
(2010) (“the court’s failure to refer to chevron, deference, a lack of ambiguity, or even the 
possibility that the statute could be ambiguous is fairly unique among opinions addressing 
assertions of jurisdictional authority, particularly with the Nlrb and in a case presenting 
no constitutional question”).
127. todd garvey, cong. reSearch Serv.¸ the JuriSprudence of JuStice John 
pauL StevenS: the chevron doctrine (may 26, 2010), available at http://www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/r41260.pdf
128. deborah N. Pearlstein, A Measure of Deference: Justice Stevens From chevron 
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this disagreement was strikingly apparent in an earlier decision, I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca. Justice stevens, writing for the majority, stated that:
 “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues on statutory construction 
and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to 
clear congressional intent.  if a court employing traditional rules of 
statutory construction ascertains that congress had an intention on the 
precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given 
effect.”129  
while agreeing with the majority’s conclusion, Justice scalia wrote a 
concurrence in which he lambasted the majority for “badly misinterpret[ing] 
Chevron” through its “exhaustive investigation of the legislative history of the 
act” which he considered to be “an ill-advised deviation” from the Chevron 
principle.130 indeed, when “the language of a statute is clear, that language must 
be given effect.”131 accordingly, whereas scalia views deference broadly,132 
stevens has sought to apply deference on issues falling within the agency’s 
expertise and has sought to deny deference on issues of statutory construction, 
something he holds to be in the expertise of the judiciary.133 Justice scalia, on 
the other hand, has objected to the view that courts’ interpretation of a statute 
should take precedence “whenever they face ‘a pure question of statutory 
construction for the courts to decide.’”134 
indeed, the question of when to apply Chevron has been 
a continued point of disagreement between Justices stevens 
and scalia, as has the question of how to apply the doctrine. 
Specifically, Scalia and Stevens have put forth differing arguments as 
to what courts should look at when analyzing legislative history.135 while 
Justice scalia embodies the “textualist” approach, arguing “for a strict ‘plain 
meaning’ approach . . . that resists looking beyond the dictionary meaning 
of the specific words Congress chose to use in the legislation,” Stevens has 
embodied the “intentionalist” approach, consistently looking “at the full history 
of a statute . . . in order to effectuate congress’ purpose.”136 in opposition to 
to hamdan, 43 u.c. daviS L. rev. 1063, 1068 (2010).
129. Immigration Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) .
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Negusie v. holder, 129 s. ct. 1159, 1168-69 (2009) (giving deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute as long as the agency’s choice is “is 
soundly reasoned, not based on irrelevant or arbitrary factors”).
133. See id. at 1171 (“courts are expert at statutory construction, while agencies are 
experts at statutory implementation.”).
134. 480 u.s. at 454-55.
135. Compare turner, supra, at note 45 (defining intentionalism as the method of 
statutory interpretation that “seeks to discern the meaning and understanding of a statutory 
provision as held by the legislature and the legislators who enacted the law” by looking 
at the statutory text and/or legislative history), with id. at 22 (defining textualism as the 
method of statutory interpretation, that argues the text is the law and that the text is what 
must be observed).
136. See robin Kundis craig, Administrative Law in the Roberts Court: The First Four 
Years, 62 adMin. L. rev. 69, 144-45 (winter 2010) (examining the relationship between 
the court, congress, and federal agencies in light of the Chevron doctrine); turner, supra, 
2012]                                     NEW PROCESS STEEL                                     195
scalia’s push for a purely textual approach, Justice stevens argued in Zuni 
Public School District No. 89 v. Dept. of Education, that “[t]here is no reason 
why [the judiciary] must confine [itself] to . . . the statutory text if other tools 
of statutory construction provide better evidence of congressional intent.”137 
statements such as this beg the question of why stevens did not look to “better 
evidence of congressional intent” in New Process Steel.
Justices scalia and stevens have stood at opposite ends of the analytical 
spectrum on when to apply Chevron deference and on which theory of 
legislative interpretation, textualism or intentionalism, is the proper approach 
for the judiciary.138 this polarity presents the question of how these two Justices 
came together in the majority opinion in New Process Steel, a decision based 
on an analysis of legislative text, history, intent, and an executive agency’s 
statutory interpretation. Did Justice Scalia finally concede that Chevron 
deference doesn’t apply in cases of statutory construction? did stevens 
concede that the judiciary need not look to legislative history to determine 
congressional intent? or did this case present the opportunity for these Justices 
to compromise, adopting a textualist approach without deference, to achieve a 
goal that they did agree on, limiting the rights of labor unions.
poSSiBLe cauSe #2 – LiMiting union rightS
Justice stevens has long been hailed as the liberal justice of the supreme 
court who has consistently fought for individuals’ liberty interests, stating that 
the concept of liberty interest is a “premise that appears throughout [stevens’] 
tenure on the court and stands as a pillar of his judicial philosophy.”139 
however, for all of the hype of Justice stevens as a liberal Justice, he has 
rarely been a friend to unions and has, at times, been the most vocal opponent 
of the rights of organized labor.140 For example, in 2008, stevens authored the 
majority opinion in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,141 in which the right of 
employers to engage in non-coercive speech about unionization was protected. 
A California law  characterized as one designed to “prevent the state from 
 
note 45 (defining intentionalism and textualism). 
137. 550 u.s. 81, 105 (2007). See also roBert Judd SickeLS, John pauL StevenS 
and the conStitution, the Search for BaLance 26 (1988) (“a more usual for(m) of 
deference to congress, for stevens, is to study the legislative history of a statute in detail 
in order to adhere faithfully to the lawmakers’ will.”).
138. For a discussion of the “textualist-intentionalist divide” see garvey, supra 
note 127 (finding that the textualist-intentionalist divide is particularly important when 
analyzing congressional intent).
139. bill barnhart & gene schlickman, John pauL StevenS:, an independent Life 
204 (2010).
140. chamber of commerce v. brown, 554 u.s. 60 (2008). See also assoc. gen. 
contractors v. carpenters, 459 u.s. 519 (1983) (holding that the district court was correct 
in finding the complaint to be insufficient); Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. NLRB, 463 U.S. 
147 (1983) (determining “the board has not yet decided whether the handbilling in this 
case was proscribed by the act. it rested its decision entirely on the publicity proviso and 
never considered whether, apart from that proviso, the union’s conduct fell within the terms 
of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(b)”); Patternmakers v. Nlrb, 473 u.s. 95 (1985).
141. 554 u.s. 60 (2008).
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subsidizing employers’ efforts to thwart unionization” was struck down.142 
 in 1980, stevens authored a concurrence in NLRB v. Retail Store Emp. 
Union, Local 1001,143 arguing for the court to discard the previous distinction 
between “signal picketing” and “publicity picketing,” which effectively 
makes both forms of picketing illegal. this effectively stripped the unions of 
yet another technique they could utilize to protect workers’ rights. Although 
this was only a concurrence, stevens’ reasoning was later approved by Justice 
Powell in a subsequent decision.144 additionally, Justice stevens, as the author 
of several majority opinions, has argued in favor of the employer in Associated 
General Contractors v. Carpenters,145 and Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. 
NLRB.146 additionally, he wrote for the dissent in Patternmakers v. NLRB.147  
although the 2010 case of Citizens United v. FEC dealt with campaign 
funding by corporations and labor unions, scalia’s eight-page concurrence 
referred solely to the issue of the rights of corporations (twenty-eight 
separate references), and did not refer to unions once.148 on the other hand, 
Stevens’ fifty-page dissent repeatedly refers to the case as one dealing 
with the rights of both corporations and labor unions.149 one possible 
explanation for this discrepancy is that whereas scalia was interested 
in protecting the rights of corporations to contribute to political campaigns, 
stevens viewed corporations and unions as equally destructive to the rights of 
individuals.150
one of the most indicative examples of Justice stevens’ views on unions 
comes from the dissent he authored in NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc., in 
which he opined that “[a]nti[-]union sentiment may be based on religious 
views, political convictions, individual respect or hostility, or family 
considerations.”151 stevens continued, stating that section 7 of the taft-hartley 
act of 1947 provides “equal protection for the employee’s right not to join a 
142. Labor Unions Lose: Justices Restore Employers’ Free-Speech Rights, 
the San diego union-triBune (July 16, 2008) http://www.signonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20080716/newslz1ed16middle.html. (discussing Gov. Gray Davis’s and the 
legislators reasons for passing this law related to the union).
143. 447 u.s. 607 (1980).
144. int’l longshoremen’s ass’n v. allied int’l, inc., 456 u.s. 212, 226 (1982) (“we 
have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation 
of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First amendment. it would seem even clearer 
that conduct designed not to communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration 
under the First amendment”). 
145. 459 u.s. 519 (1983).
146. 463 u.s. 147 (1983).
147. 473 u.s. 95 (1985).
148. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 925-29 (2010) (arguing that the 
dissent has a distorted view about the role of the corporation in society).
149. See id. at 929-79 (“the court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of 
elected institutions across the Nation. the path it has taken to reach its outcome will, i fear, 
do damage to this institution”).
150. C.f., id. (allowing for the possible interpretation that stevens regarded unlimited 
union contributions to political campaigns to be improper and dangerous).
151. 469 u.s. 490, 499 (1985).
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union as for the right to support a union.”152 thus, stevens has consistently 
put forth the argument that the rights of individuals need to be protected from 
labor unions. therefore, from this perspective, New Process Steel presented 
Justice stevens with the opportunity to vacate hundreds of pro-union decisions 
with a single stroke of the pen. while the case presented stevens with the 
ability to base his reasoning on statutory construction, the fact that the results 
are so pitted against the rights of unions leads to the reasonable conclusion that 
Justice stevens took this opportunity to thwart the american labor movement 
prior to his retirement from the bench.
concLuSion
while Justice stevens is technically correct in suggesting that congress 
can prevent the recurrence of the devastating effects of the New Process Steel 
decision by amending the statute to allow a two-member board to decide 
cases, the state of the national attitude towards the labor movement makes 
such an amendment highly improbable.153 For example, recent attempts by the 
governors of wisconsin and ohio to end collective bargaining rights for public 
employees has been described as just “the tip of the iceberg” of a pervasive 
anti-union attitude in government.154 in a march 2011 vote in the house for an 
amendment that would defund the Nlrb for approximately six months, “the 
house leadership supported abolishing the right of both private sector and 
public sector workers to bargain collectively.”155 thus, it appears unlikely that 
the legislative branch would support any amendment that may empower the 
board or aid the labor movement.
the fact that New Process Steel came before the court in the waning days of 
Justice stevens’ tenure on the bench may explain why he felt compelled to so 
abruptly abandon his intentionalist approach to legislative analysis, ensuring 
the narrowing of the Chevron doctrine while simultaneously accomplishing 
a minimization of the rights of labor unions.156 to adhere to the principle of 
intentionalism that he had long argued in favor of would, at best, have curried 
only a concurrence from Justice scalia, with the other four dissenters still 
disagreeing with the result. it would thereby deny stevens a majority of the 
court.
thus, it appears that this case presented Justice stevens with an opportunity 
to confront and settle two issues of law that he had consistently fought for during 
 
152. Id. at 500 (emphasis in original).
153. New Process steel, lP v. Nlrb, 130 s. ct. 2635, 2644-45 (2010) (“if congress 
wishes to allow the board to decide cases with only two members, it can easily do so”).
154. harold meyerson, Wisconsin Just Tip of Anti-Labor Iceberg, capitaL tiMeS, 
march 2, 2011, at 28, available at 2011 wlNr 4125591.
155. Id. (noting that the decline of private sector union membership to 6.9 percent has 
resulted in the growth of “resentment toward unionized public sector workers . . . [thereby] 
creating a political opportunity for republicans to mount their assault”).
156. The classification of Stevens’s abandonment as “abrupt” is based on his dissent 
in Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 952-53, issued less than five months prior to New Process, 
in which he provided a thorough analysis of legislative history to glean the intent of the 
legislature.
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 his half-century on the bench.  with this end in sight, stevens abandoned the use 
of legislative history to understand legislative intent, omitted any discussion of 
deference to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its regulatory statute, 
and, fleetingly acknowledged the sheer magnitude of injustice that the decision 
will heap upon the american labor movement, positing an unrealistic solution. 
Justice stevens concludes his opinion by cautioning that agreement with the 
Board’s interpretation of the Act would mean that the Board is authorized “to 
create a tail that would not only wag the dog, but would continue to wag after 
the dog died.”157  Fearful of this result, Justice stevens crafted a decision that 
not only cut off the tail, but also cut the dog’s legs off in the process, thereby 
ensuring the stagnancy, and perhaps the ultimate demise, of the american 
labor movement.
157. 130 s. ct. at 2645.
